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INTRODUCTION
The greatest impact of the novel coronavirus on most of our lives has not
been physiological. Rather, the impact has come from state governments’
responses to the virus. In much of the country, stay-at-home measures have shut
down our lives—including our ability to continue with our employment, study,
religious practice, socializing, and access to arts and entertainment.1
Commentary on the legality of these measures has been limited at the time of
writing, but some commenters have suggested that courts might find them
vulnerable on the grounds that they cannot survive heightened judicial scrutiny.2
These commentators contend that although the measures serve an important state
interest, they are not narrowly tailored to limiting COVID-19’s spread. While
most individuals have been acquiescent so far, these commentators argue that
“the lawsuits” may “start flying,” and indeed, some challenges have

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38HX15R59.
Copyright © 2020 Craig Konnoth
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. My thanks to Jennifer
Hendricks, Helen Norton, Steph Tai, and Lindsay Wiley, for comments on short notice; Peter Selimos
and Erin Vanek for short notice research assistance and Kelly Illseng for Bluebooking assistance.
1. See infra notes 18-27.
2. See infra notes 31-33.
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commenced.3 As this essay goes to press, over 40 challenges appear to have
commenced.4
Given the situation that states have found themselves in, I believe that their
response to the COVID-19 threat has been appropriate—and the limited judicial
authority that exists at the time of writing agrees.5 But any court that applies
heightened scrutiny and is inclined to hold otherwise should take into account
offsets the government has provided when the court assesses the burdens that
any plaintiff must endure. That is, while the government has imposed broad
burdens across society, it has also offset those burdens through a series of
measures including expanded unemployment compensation, one-time stimulus
payments, and other kinds of assistance.6 As narrow tailoring requires the
government to minimize the burdens placed on individuals, the narrow tailoring
analysis should take into account both burdens as well as offsetting benefits that
the government provides.
This approach to narrow tailoring is novel. When the government burdens
constitutional rights, such as rights to speech, assembly, or equal protection,
there have been no programs that get the government off the hook by
compensating individuals for the burdens imposed. While the mitigation efforts
associated with the COVID-19 response were not adopted specifically to
mitigate constitutional burdens imposed by that response, the effect of these
efforts has nonetheless been to mitigate the burdens than many individuals have
experienced. To be sure, the various shortcomings and ambiguities in the
mitigation efforts adopted in relation to COVID-19 may mean that they will
prove insufficient and irrelevant to any constitutional analysis. However, they
offer a rare opportunity to think more broadly about how constitutional scrutiny
should handle mitigation efforts.
Part I offers an overview of the coronavirus pandemic and the government
response. Part II offers a summary of the criticism that the response would fail
to satisfy strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored. Part III summarizes
3. Harry Litman, Column: Here’s what’s wrong with Gov. Newsom’s stay-at-home order: It’s
a legal mess, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2526, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-03-25/gavinnewsom-stay-at-home-order-quarantine-coronavirus-covid-19; Lindsey Wiley, The Coronavirus
Lawsuits are Coming. That’s Not a Bad Thing, WASH. POST. (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/23/coronavirus-lawsuits-are-coming-thats-notbad-thing/; Marshall Zelinger, Denver citing non-essential businesses for staying open during pandemic,
9NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020),; https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/denver-citing-non-essentialbusinesses-for-staying-open-during-pandemic/73-d8623d7b-16ff-4e41-a823-3c41818fe0a2.
4. John Kruzel, Legal challenges to stay-at-home orders gain momentum, THE HILL (May 16,
2020)
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/498096-legal-challenges-to-stay-at-home-ordersgain-momentum?fbclid=IwAR28fj_7vF0ssPDxAjdBjclbjtsfkirF3qGGXBhDVRFZlc4g1ugccb6kBEI.
5. See e.g. Binford v. Sunuu, Order on Pls’. Pet. for Prelim. Inj. & Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, No.
217-2020-CV-00152,
(N.H.
March
25,
2020)
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/032520Sununu-order.pdf; In re Abbott, Order
Granting
Writ
of
Mandamus,
954
F.3d
772
(5th
Cir.
2020),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6827399-5th-Circuit-04072020.html.
6. See infra Part III.
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the offsets the government has adopted to mitigate the burdens imposed by its
coronavirus response. Part IV then excavates more fully the concept of narrow
tailoring and argues that the government offsets should be taken into account.
Part V limits the argument, explaining that only offsets that have a nexus to a
certain set of constitutional burdens should be cognizable.
I.
OVERVIEW OF THE CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE
Officially named Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19, the new or
“novel” coronavirus was first identified in December 2019.7 The condition is
highly infectious because of its low mortality rate and its tendency to spread
while the patient is asymptomatic.8 Without intervention, the virus has a
reproduction number (R0) of 2.2—that is, each infected person will spread the
virus to more than two additional people.9 Depending on the jurisdiction,
responses to curtail spread have varied. The problem is threefold. First, COVID19 is highly contagious, as already noted. Second, COVID-19 can survive on
surfaces for days.10 This leads to the third problem: there is a shortage of
COVID-19 tests, which will not disappear anytime soon.11 The President refuses
to invoke statutory authority to produce more tests at the time of writing.12 As a
result of the shortage of tests, it is hard to identify who is contagious and who is
not.
The solution has been to ask everyone to stay at home. This ensures that
asymptomatic individuals cannot spread COVID-19 through contact, which is
the standard purpose of quarantine.13 It also ensures that uninfected individuals
will not catch the virus, themselves becoming vectors of transmission.14
As is traditional, it is the states rather than the federal government that have
imposed most coercive limitations.15 These limitations seek to prevent contact
between individuals that could result in transmission. New York and California,
7. Anthony S. Fauci et al., COVID-19 — Navigating the Uncharted, 382 N. ENGL. J. MED
1268 (2020).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. N van Doremalen, et al, Aerosol and Surface Stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2)
Compared to SARS-CoV-1, N. ENG. J. MED., Mar. 17, 2020, available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973.
11. Donald Judd, America is Ramping Up Covid-19 Testing, but a Shortage of Basic Supplies
CNN.COM
(Mar.
28,
2020),
is
Limiting
Capabilities,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/28/politics/coronavirus-swabs-supplies-shortage-states/index.html.
12. Joshua Gotbaum, Use the Defense Production Act for more than just Ventilators, WASH.
POST (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/28/use-defense-productionact-more-than-just-ventilators/.
13. Tara Parker-Pope, What You Can Do About Coronavirus Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-preparation-preparedness.html.
14. Id.
15. Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, Covid-19 — The Law and Limits of Quarantine, N.
ENG. J. MED (April 9, 2020) https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMp2004211.
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which have had among the highest cases, are among several states that have
imposed “stay at home” orders and required all non-essential businesses to
transition to operating online or closing.16 The businesses that states have shut
down include restaurants, bars, coffee shops, spas, and barber shops.17 The
federal government, in turn, has limited entry into the country.18
The approach that the government has taken has affected the livelihoods of
numerous individuals. Eighteen percent of respondents to a March 14 poll
reported lost hours or employment.19 Food preparation and serving occupations,
which employ over 8.3 million individuals nationwide,20 are projected to lose or
limit 7.4 million jobs on one estimate.21 Nearly 50,000 retail stores have been
shut down.22 Hotels have begun a first wave of laying off employees, nearly half
a million of whom are under the age of 35.23 Airlines will suffer about $20 billion
in losses and are laying off workers at a record pace.24 Other industries that have

16. Cal. Executive Order N-33-20 (Mar. 4 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf; Governor
Cuomo Issues Guidance on Essential Services Under The ‘New York State on PAUSE’ Executive Order,
NY.GOV (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-issues-guidanceessential-services-under-new-york-state-pause-executive-order; Bill Chappell & Vanessa Romo, New
York, Illinois Governors Issue Stay At Home Orders, Following California’s Lead (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/20/818952589/coronavirus-n-y-govcuomo-says-100-of-workforce-must-stay-home.
17. Updated Notice of Public Health Order 20-22 Closing Bars, Restaurants, Theaters,
Gymnasiums, Casinos, Nonessential Personal Services Facilities, and Horse Track and Off-Track
Betting Facilities Statewide, Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14X5zbYPY7LJ8zzzSv_GcApJauFmsc5Ju/view.
18. Andrea Salcedo, Sanam Yar, & Gina Cherelus, Coronavirus Travel Restrictions, Across the
Globe, N.Y. TIMES (April 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-travelrestrictions.html.
19. NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll National Tables March 13th through March 14th, 2020,
at
21,
available
at
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NPR_PBSNewsHour_Marist-Poll_USA-NOS-and-Tables_2003151338.pdf#page=3.
20. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Household Data Annual Averages, 11b: Employed
Persons by Detailed Occupation and Age, 2019 data, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.pdf.
21. Challenger, Gray & Christmas Inc., Update: COVID-19 Has Claimed Over 3K Jobs, Over
http://www.challengergray.com/press/press9M
Threatened,
CHALLENGERGRAY.COM,
releases/update-covid-19-has-claimed-over-3k-jobs-over-9m-threatened (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020).
22. Jordyn Holman et al, 47,000 U.S. Stores Closed in About a Week Over Coronavirus,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 24, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-retailstore-closings.
23. Lisette Voytko , Coronavirus Layoffs: Landry’s Inc., Philly YMCA Latest To Let Workers
Go
Amid
Pandemic,
FORBES.COM
(Mar.
26,
2020)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2020/03/22/coronavirus-layoffs-airports-latest-to-shedjobs-during-pandemic/#4c59f98c7b9d; BLS, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
Survey, Household Data Annual Averages, 18b: Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation and Age,
2019 data, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm. (hotel housekeeping and hotel desk clerks).
24. Dawn Gilbertson, American Airlines Cuts 55,000 Flights, Parks 450 Planes Amid
(Mar.
18,
2020)
Coronavirus:
‘Fight
of
Our
Lives’,
USA
TODAY
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/airline-news/2020/03/18/coronavirus-travel-fallout-unitedjetblue-allegiant-slash-flights/2863432001/; BLS, supra note 20.
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been practically shut down include cruise lines,25 rideshare transportation,26
movie theaters,27 and the film industry.28
Individuals do not, of course, come together just to work. The states’ orders
interfere with other important practices. For example, church pastors have been
arrested for continuing in-person services with large groups of individuals.29
In the long run, an ideal solution would be to create some kind of targeted
system to make sure only those who are contagious or potentially contagious are
kept quarantined or isolated. Indeed, top Obama healthcare advisor Zeke
Emanuel has suggested the creation of a coronavirus “certification system” to
ensure that only individuals who have been cleared can go out into the
workforce.30 But existing technology and political will are far away from
permitting such possibilities. After acknowledging that a coronavirus
certification system “would require the full commitment and attention of the
federal government,” Emanuel himself ends his article proposing such a system
with a question: “Is that possible?”31 Unfortunately, the answer so far has been
no.
II.
POSSIBLE CONCERNS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONALITY
On formal constitutional accounts, judicial scrutiny of a challenged
government regulation consists of two main components: an analysis of the
purpose of the regulation and an analysis of the fit between the purpose and the
kinds of restrictions the regulation imposes. Rational basis scrutiny only requires
a legitimate purpose and a reasonable fit.32 Strict scrutiny, which applies in times
of non-emergency when the government treads on fundamental rights, such as
the right of assembly, requires a compelling interest to which the regulation is
narrowly tailored.33

25. Amy Laskowski, Coronavirus Is Hitting the Cruise Line Industry Hard, BU.COM (Feb. 25,
2020) http://www.bu.edu/articles/2020/coronavirus-is-hitting-the-cruise-line-industry-hard/
26. Grant Suneson, Industries Hit Hardest by Coronavirus in the US Include Retail,
USA
TODAY
(Mar.
21,
2020)
Transportation,
and
Travel,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/20/us-industries-being-devastated-by-thecoronavirus-travel-hotels-food/111431804/.
27. Id.
28. Adam Epstein, Coronavirus is pushing an Already Vulnerable Film Industry Closer to the
Edge, QUARTZ, (Mar. 9, 2020) https://qz.com/1813387/a-vulnerable-film-industry-feels-the-impactfrom-coronavirus/.
29. Tamara Lush & Chris O’Meara, Florida megachurch pastor arrested for holding services,
(Mar.
31,
2020)
defying
social
distancing
orders,
USATODAY.COM
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/03/31/coronavirus-florida-megachurch-pastorarrested-church-amid-orders/5093160002/.
30. Ezekiel Emanuel, We Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html.
31. Id.
32. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985).
33. Id. at 439.
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Legal commentary on the COVID-19 response has been sparse at the time
of writing. However, because the government has taken action to limit important
rights in light of the emergency, at least some authorities suggest that courts may
decide to subject the coronavirus response to strict scrutiny. Former U.S.
Attorney Harry Litman for example, argues in the Los Angeles Times that the
government must “show that it has a ‘compelling interest’ . . . and that its action
is the ‘least restrictive’ means for achieving it.”34 Public health law scholar
Lindsey Wiley similarly suggests in the Washington Post that some judges may
hold at least certain stay-at-home measures unconstitutional.35 Other legal
scholars have argued that quarantine case law indicates that these measures call
for heightened scrutiny.36 To be sure, there is authority that suggests that a
heightened standard is not warranted. So far, courts reviewing state government
actions have largely repudiated almost any judicial review,37 though Steve
Vladeck and Lindsay Wiley have argued for a more robust judicial examination
(without advocating for strict scrutiny).38
Assuming, arguendo, that a court finds that fundamental rights are at stake
and that some kind of heightened scrutiny therefore applies, a state would have
to show both an important or compelling purpose—a requirement I assume is
met here—and some kind of substantial tailoring between the purpose and the
regulations at issue. But what exactly does this “narrow tailoring” mean? In his
article Narrow Tailoring, Ian Ayres discusses various understandings of the
concept.39 He suggests that on one reading, the burdens and benefits that the
government distributes cannot be over- or under-inclusive.40 On another reading,
the “government [must] achieve its compelling . . . interest in the way that least
restricts or burdens the fundamental rights”—essentially, what amounts to a least
restrictive alternative test.41

34. Litman, supra note 3.
35. Wiley, supra note 3.
36. Parmet, surpa note 15.
37. Lindsay F. Wiley & Steve Vladeck, COVID-19 Reinforces the Argument for ‘Regular’
Judicial Review—Not Suspension of Civil Liberties—In Times of Crisis, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (April 9,
2020)
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/covid-19-reinforces-the-argument-for-regular-judicialreview-not-suspension-of-civil-liberties-in-times-of-crisis/. See also Binford v. Sunuu, Order on Pls’.
Pet. for Prelim. Inj. & Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, No. 217-2020-CV-00152, (N.H. March 25, 2020)
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/032520Sununu-order.pdf; In re Abbott, Order
Granting
Writ
of
Mandamus,
954
F.3d
772
(5th
Cir.
2020),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6827399-5th-Circuit-04072020.html.
38. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 37.
39. Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1783 (1995). Ayres writes
specifically in the context of affirmative action that seeks to remedy invidious discrimination. His
account is not meant to be exhaustive, but it offers a framework through which to understand the concept.
40. Id. at 1787.
41. Id. at 1788. On yet a third account, which would apply in an equal protection context, narrow
tailoring is designed to limit divisiveness between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups. Situations
where the government has to distinguish between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, especially in
highly visible ways (such as by mandating racial quotas), can increase divisiveness. Id. at 1790-93.
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The state would survive heightened scrutiny on the first understanding of
narrow tailoring if we take it to mean that the state must avoid over- or underinclusiveness as much as possible. Assuming that this requirement would permit
states to isolate only individuals who are contagious (though the case law in the
area remains murky), it is likely that few tests would be available due to supply
chain disruption to determine who is contagious.42
The issue comes when we consider whether a regulation survives narrow
tailoring under Ayres’s second account of the concept: has the government
minimized burdens arising from the regulation, or adopted the least restrictive
version of the regulation that is compatible with COVID-19 control?
The extent to which the measures are necessary will change based on
location and time. In much of the country, to be sure, it would appear that stayat-home orders are necessary: Lacking tests, states must enforce these orders to
prevent deaths. Deaths in New York City and New Orleans, for example, have
grown exponentially, as have the number of cases.43 Some outliers might emerge
due to the success of government efforts: at the time of writing, the San Francisco
Bay Area has managed to “flatten the curve,” limiting the rate of increase of
infections.44 There are variations across other areas as well.45 Further, if
measures do not work, the virus spreads to new locations, requiring government
in those locations to adopt measures.46 Thus, whether a government action
satisfies heightened scrutiny for a skeptical court will be a constantly evolving
analysis depending upon where and when the litigation is occurring.
Nonetheless, even if a court applies heightened scrutiny, it may yet
appropriately conclude that the exigent circumstances and lack of tests mean that
the state has minimized burdens no matter the location. Indeed, I am on record
suggesting that compliance is appropriate.47 Moreover, the states’ orders permit
individuals to engage in essential activities, such as grocery shopping, and even
outdoor exercise—they seem reasonably narrowly tailored.48 And again, while
tests would allow the states to ease restrictions, there is evidence that even if
42. Robert P. Baird, Why Widespread Coronavirus Testing Isn’t Coming Anytime Soon, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 24, 2020) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-widespread-coronavirustesting-isnt-coming-anytime-soon
43. Bernadette Hogan, New York’s Coronavirus Death Toll Jumps 100 in Just One Day to 385,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 26, 2020); Katy Reckdahl et al, New Orleans Faces a Virus Crisis, and Mardi Gras
May be Why, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020).
44. Maura Caslyn et al, Social Distancing To Fight Coronavirus: A Strategy That Is Working
and
Must Continue, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 25, 2020)
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2020/03/25/482278/social-distancing-fightcoronavirus-strategy-working-must-continue/.
45. Id.
46. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24,
2020) https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html.
47. Chelsea Brentzel, Over 1,600 complaints related to COVID-19 health order filed in El Paso
County, KRDO (April 7, 2020) https://krdo.com/news/2020/04/07/over-1600-complaints-related-tocovid-19-health-order-filed-in-el-paso-county/
48. See Colorado order, supra note 17.
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action had been taken sooner, availability would have been limited due to supply
chain disruption.49
However, should courts conclude that the measures are too broad, it would
appear that state governments would be faced with two alternatives: either do
nothing and risk numerous deaths or issue broad stay-at-home orders that
arguably impinge on individual rights.
III.
GOVERNMENT RELIEF
The burdens that the COVID-19 response has imposed are extensive, but
the federal government has taken measures to minimize the burden. In its first
bill, passed March 6, the federal government sought only to increase emergency
preparedness for the virus and boost screening and testing capacity.50 On March
18, the government passed a bill that would also alleviate the harms the response
to the virus has imposed. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act51
increases unemployment benefits, offering states nearly $1 billion for paying
unemployment insurance and processing fees, and increases assistance in certain
states for individuals who have already exhausted benefits.52 A similar amount
is allocated to maintain food security, including funding for the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children and for those
households where the child’s school has been closed for at least five consecutive
days.53 Finally, employers with fewer than 500 employees must provide
employees with two weeks of paid sick leave if they are subject to quarantine,
are experiencing symptoms of COVID–19, or have children in schools that have
closed.54
The Response Act is dwarfed by an even larger stimulus statute, the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) passed on
March 27, with a price tag of $2 trillion. The statute provides one-time $1200
payments to individuals earning less than $75,000 a year per their 2018 or 2019
tax returns, phasing these payments out as individuals approach $99,000 a year.55
Those eligible for payments receive $500 per child.56 Payments were intended

49. Baird, supra note 42.
50. Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L.
116-123 (Mar. 6. 2020).
51. H.R.
6201,
Pub.
L.
116-127
(2020)
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6201/BILLS-116hr6201enr.pdf.
52. Id. at 15-18.
53. Id. at 2-3, 7 to 12.
54. Id. at 12-15, 18-24.
55. H.R. 748 at 55 (enrolled bill), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr748/BILLS116hr748enr.pdf (hereinafter CARES Act).
56. Id.
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to arrive within three weeks, per the Treasury Secretary.57 The CARES Act also
expands unemployment benefits for at least 13 weeks over what states usually
offer and renders self-employed individuals and part-time workers eligible.58
The statute provides for a three-month eviction moratorium for tenants in
properties on which there are mortgages backed or owned by federal entities such
as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, barring landlords from charging fees or penalties
for nonpayment of rent.59 It provides for $350 billion to the Small Business
Administration to provide loans of up to $10 million per business, many of which
are forgivable.60 Finally, the statute allocates $15.5 billion for the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), with an additional $450 million for food
banks and other community food programs.61
States are imposing similar relief measures. For example, executive orders
by Colorado’s governor instituted a moratorium on evictions and utility
disconnection and sought to expedite unemployment claims payments in the face
of record filings.62 The city of Denver created a $4 million relief fund for small
businesses and artists.63 Other states and localities have taken similar steps,
which have included measures from the creation of community childcare centers
to the implementation of microloan programs.64
For some, the benefits may be significant. Indeed, one scholar calculates
that based purely on the federal unemployment benefits expansion, some
workers earning up to $60,000 per year who lose their jobs will earn more money
through the unemployment benefits expansion than they would have earned
when holding their jobs, as long as they receive the expanded benefits.65 To be
sure, this calculation does not take into account lost benefits, but many
employers, for example restaurants, do not offer their employees benefits.66 This
calculation also does not take into account the $1200 stimulus payment.

57. Tara Bernard, F.A.Q. on Stimulus Checks, Unemployment and the Coronavirus Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-stimulus-package-questionsanswers.html.
58. CARES Act, supra note 55, at 35 (limiting assistance to 39 weeks). See Bernard, supra note
57 (states cap unemployment assistance at 26 weeks or less).
59. CARES Act, supra note 55, at 211.
60. Id. at 10, 17-21, 41.
61. Id. at 228.
62. Col. Exec. Order No. D 2020 012 (Mar. 20, 2020) available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mMCRLb6PxMPI680_THFn4nqLGAty1jq9/view.
63. Conrad Swanson, Denver Mayor Announces Economic Relief for Businesses Hurt by
Coronavirus, DENVER POST (Mar. 19, 2020) https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/19/denvercoronavirus-small-business-relief/.
64. Credit Karma Staff, Coronavirus Federal, State and Local Relief Measures, CREDIT
KARMA (Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.creditkarma.com/advice/i/coronavirus-us-state-local-reliefmeasures/.
65. Email from Nadav Orien Peer to Craig Konnoth.
66. Rosie Bradbury, 31% of restaurants offer health insurance to workers, suvery finds,
RESTAURANT DIVE (July 31, 2019) https://www.restaurantdive.com/news/survey-31-of-restaurantsoffer-health-insurance-to-workers/559857/.
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IV.
RECONSIDERING NARROW TAILORING
In light of this government relief, let us return to the least restrictive
alternative approach to narrow tailoring. This approach is ubiquitous in
heightened scrutiny analysis across constitutional doctrines.67 Across each of
these areas of doctrine, the court looks to see whether the government, at the
outset, could have adopted a more limited regulation—one that minimized
burdens on important interests—and still achieved its purpose.68
In the affirmative action context, for example, the Supreme Court has
looked to see whether the government could have achieved its objective through
“race-neutral” means, thus (in theory at least) not imposing the indignity of
discrimination when it could have been avoided.69 In the dormant Commerce
Clause cases, similarly, the Court has looked to see whether states could have
achieved their purpose without discriminating against out-of-state commerce. 70
Similarly, in the free speech context, the Court has disapproved state regulation
that limited speech by pharmaceutical entities steering consumers towards higher
priced drugs.71 Instead of imposing that restriction, the Court noted, a state could
counter pharmaceutical speech “through its own speech.”72 More recently, in
Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the Court (in applying a statutory least restrictive
alternative test) invalidated an Affordable Care Act that employer insurance
offer contraceptive benefits.73 The reason: the government could have
established (and, in other circumstances, had established a program through
which it, rather than the employer, would offer the coverage).74
67. See generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) (discussing equal protection,
First amendment, due process, and Commerce Clause case law). See also C. Scott. Hemphill, Less
Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 950 n.89 (2016) (listing cases from
numerous areas of constitutional law).
68. I envisage the challenges as due process rather than equal protection challenges since the
restrictions are broad and apply to nearly every individual equally, notwithstanding their individual
circumstances.
69. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 312 (2013) (narrow tailoring “require[s] a court to
examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives.’”). But see Ayres, supra note 39, at 1790 (arguing that race-neutral means counter
this version of narrow tailoring).
70. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (asking “whether alternative means” where
the state did not discriminate “could promote . . . [its] purpose as well”).
71. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (asking whether state interest could
“‘be served as well by a more limited restriction’” (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980))); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be
at least as effective” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
72. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
73. Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2800–02 (2014). While the requirement for less
restrictive means was statutorily imposed, the Court’s application was consistent with the constitutional
cases on which it relied. Indeed, the statutory test was drawn from the Court’s since-overruled
constitutional doctrine. Id. at 2760.
74. Id.
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However, while these cases consider the burden the government imposed
at the outset, they did not consider any offsetting compensation that the
government may have offered to mitigate the burden. The reason for that is
simple: the government rarely, if ever, provides an offset for a constitutional
violation.
Commenters have considered the possibility of constitutional offsets, most
prominently in the debate over whether constitutional rights should be protected
by liability rules rather than property rules.75 A property rule would render
unconstitutional any action by the government that deprives an individual of
rights. Under a liability rule, it would be constitutionally valid for the
government to take actions that would otherwise violate protected rights as long
as it pays for the privilege of doing so. Eugene Kontorovich, for example, argues
that during national security emergencies, “upon finding a detention program
unconstitutional, courts could refuse to enjoin it and instead award the detainees
money damages for the duration of their confinement. This is essentially a
Takings Clause approach to nonproperty rights.”76 This, he argues, is the
superior outcome, because in emergencies, especially those where transaction
costs are high, courts will be reluctant to altogether enjoin detention programs
carried out in the name of national security. Without a liability rule alternative,
courts will likely simply hold these programs constitutional. Under a liability
rule, those burdened will at least be paid for their pains..77 Other authors have
made similar arguments.78
Although my primary task here is not to critique Kantorovich’s approach,
I do not think that it is the best way for constitutional law to take cognizance of
government offsets. Indeed, I believe that critics of Kantorovich are correct in
arguing that his conclusion is undermined by constitutional text, by the intent of
the Framers, and for various other reasons.79 Moreover, it represents a sharp
departure from existing constitutional doctrine.

75. Other scholars have briefly considered the issue. For example, Reva Siegel has noted that
legislatures that impose abortion restrictions could adopt “measures to offset the consequences of
compelled motherhood for women, whether by compensating them, or by protecting their employment
and education opportunities, or by affording them needed medical services and child care.” Siegel,
Reasoning From the Body: An Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 366 (1992). The failure to do so suggests that women are viewed
stereotypically.
76. Eugene Kantorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass
Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 759 (2004).
77. Notably, he invokes the possibility of applying this approach during quarantines as well. Id.
at 825-26.
78. Michael Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2453, 2471 n. 102 (collecting numerous other articles).
79. Id. 2475-79 (offering numerous rebuttals to Kantorovich’s argument). Indeed, I believe that
expressive harms from adopting liability rules are even higher, as individuals are less likely to see rights
protected by liability rules as inalienable. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the
Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (1998) (noting that endowment effects are
higher with property rules).
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A far more natural doctrinal context in which to consider constitutional
offsets that is far more consistent with existing case law, is the context of narrow
tailoring, when courts consider whether the government has minimized the
burdens it has imposed. In the consideration of whether burdens have been
minimized, there seems to be no reason for not considering both the regulation
imposing the burden, and complementary steps the government has taken to
alleviate it. If the assessment that the Court employs—as it always has—is the
total burden a regulation imposes on an individual, then the regulation itself, as
well as corollary regulations should be taken into account.
Analyzing narrow tailoring in this manner offers a new lens upon the
restrictions the government has imposed. If courts choose to impose heightened
scrutiny and then find that the government’s actions are not justified even by the
exigent circumstances that exist, courts should look to offsets. Offset legislation,
like the Response and CARES Acts, may render the regulation more narrowly
tailored.
The narrow tailoring approach I offer would not represent a massive
doctrinal innovation. Courts have not, to my knowledge, considered offsets in
determining whether narrow tailoring has occurred, but they have not had the
opportunity: governments appear never to have provided such offsets or argued
that those offsets provide for narrow tailoring. But when courts consider how
much individuals are burdened, it would make little sense for them to exclude
benefits and compensation that accompany the burden. Existing constitutional
doctrine, then, is compatible with considering the burden imposed in toto.
At the same time, such offset legislation may offer greater leeway to
legislatures. Courts often defer to legislatures in cases of scientific uncertainty.80
But where legislatures fear that courts may not defer, for whatever reason—for
example, where research is uncertain or contradictory—legislatures may offer
offsets that minimize burdens to further insulate their regulation from judicial
invalidation.
I emphasize, however, that while it offers us an opportunity to think about
how to incorporate offset analysis into constitutional scrutiny, my claim here is
not that offset legislation would necessarily insulate stay-at-home orders from
constitutional challenge. First, the Response and CARES Acts have proven to be
a limited response to the challenges individuals face. Housing protections have
been uncertain and unclear.81 Small business assistance has run out within days
of its enactment.82 Further, as this Essay goes to press, states are facing deep
shortfalls, in part from the shutdown policies they pursued, and will be cutting

80. Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on
Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 J. of Const. L. 671, 673 (2009).
81. Email from Jana Happel, Colorado Legal Services, to Craig Konnoth, on file with author.
82. Erica Werner et al, Treasury’s Mnuchin seeks additional $250 billion to replenish smallbusiness coronavirus progam, WASH. POST (April 7, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2020/04/07/treasury-coronavirus-small-business/.
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spending to important programs such as Medicaid.83 This may affect the analysis
of the net burden individuals experience.
More importantly, the Acts were not passed in order to minimize burdens
on fundamental rights: they minimize the burdens of economic harms, which
may or may not align with a fundamental rights analysis. It is, after all, unclear
that the right to come together to engage in economic production and earn a
livelihood is fundamental.84 It is clear that the right to assemble for religious
worship is fundamental.85 The CARES Act, however, is designed to offset
burdens for those who have suffered economic harm. Thus, all individuals do
not obtain benefits from the Act to the same degree. Those who remain employed
and enjoy a high income, for example, may obtain no aid. If those individuals
challenge state actions, the government can show no offset. But the vast majority
of Americans will be able to claim some offset as a result of the CARES Act,
and the courts should take into account those offsets when deciding whether the
states’ actions pass constitutional muster.86
V.
NEXUS BETWEEN BURDENS AND OFFSETS
How exactly do we assess whether a burden and offsetting benefits are
sufficiently related such that they should be assessed together? In other words,
imagine an individual who owns a renewable energy business challenges the
stay-at-home regulation, which costs her significant revenue.87 Unrelated to
those public health orders, the legislature passes significant subsidies for
renewable energy, the same day the stay at home order is issued, that would end
up effectively revitalizing the individual’s business.88 Assume that the subsidy
legislation had been in the works for months, long before COVID-19 was a
known entity. It would seem strange for a court to conclude that it should take

83. Elise Schmelzer & Sam Tabachink, Gov. Jared Polis limits evictions, cuts immediate state
POST
(May
1,
2020)
spending
by
$228.7
million,
DENVER
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/05/01/polis-coronavirus-covid-state-spending/.
84. To my mind, it should be, within appropriate limits. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further
Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1104 (1986).
85. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012) (noting the heightened protections of religious organizations).
86. To take economic stimulus payments as an example, 70% of American households in 2018
earned $99,000 or less in 2018 and are eligible for offsetting stimulus payments under CARES.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203183/percentage-distribution-of-household-income-in-the-us/.
Assuming that at least some of the additional 22% of households that earn less than $199,000 are twoincome households, they too would be eligible for offsets. Moreover, individuals can take advantage of
employment compensation benefits no matter what their income.
87. See Michael Holder, Coronavirus: Falling Power Demand is Impacting Clean Energy,
GREEN BIZ (Mar. 26, 2020) https://www.greenbiz.com/article/coronavirus-falling-power-demandimpacting-clean-energy (discussing how the virus’s spread is affecting renewable energy).
88. See Craig Konnoth, Preemption through Privatization, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (discussing such subsidies).
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the unrelated subsidy legislation into account when assessing the burden of the
public health order.
In other words, there should be some relationship between the government
legislation that burdens and the legislation that offsets the burden. We might look
to other areas of the law that similarly demand a nexus between pieces of
legislation. Most prominently, Spending Clause doctrine requires that Congress
may induce states to engage in certain behavior as a condition of federal funding
only if, inter alia, the condition is stated unambiguously and is “directly related”
to some specific, national program.89 Thus, in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB), the Court held that Congress could
not “terminate . . . independent grants” if the state did not accept its conditions.90
At issue in NFIB was a condition Congress imposed in the Affordable Care Act:
either states expanded Medicaid to cover numerous additional categories of
individuals, or they lost all Medicaid funding.91 A bare majority of the Court held
that the changes “accomplishe[d] a shift in kind, not merely degree” and were a
whole new program.92 The dissent disagreed, noting that Medicaid had been
expanded dramatically before.93 Either way, as NFIB is the first time that the
Court struck down Spending Clause legislation in this way, the doctrine is not
sufficiently developed to be instructive for other areas of law.
The test I propose is a causal nexus between the offsets and the burdens that
are imposed. That is, the offsets would not have been provided but for the
regulatory burdens. It would not matter whether the legislation is in the same or
different bill: sometimes provisions in omnibus bills are completely unrelated.94
And as with the COVID-19 response, related regulatory responses may pass
weeks apart from each other.
Indeed, offsets may be adopted not just at different times but by different
authorities. The shelter-in-place orders are the product of municipal and state
regulation. While the federal offsets sometimes give discretion to local entities
to determine whether or not to mitigate, many of the key steps are federally
driven. However, it would be wrong to conclude that since the states did not
engage in mitigation, their public health measures are therefore not narrowly
tailored.95 The federal government’s response is understandable only in light of
the measures that states have adopted. Indeed, as scholars of federalism
emphasize, states and the federal government often act as partners, including by

89. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
90. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (plurality opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 583.
93. Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Abbe Gluck et al, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1789, 1800 (2015).
95. Indeed, given the states’ lack of ability to obtain supplies for COVID-19 testing and
mitigation, it would appear that they have no means at their disposal to mitigate the burden beyond
lobbying the federal government.
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co-administering programs such as the health insurance exchanges in the
Affordable Care Act (some run by state governments and some by federal
entities),96 co-enforcing federal health privacy laws,97 and coordinating on law
enforcement.98
States are similarly enmeshed within Centers for Disease Control
programs: the CDC has established state networks for key initiatives such as
injury prevention, on which states take the lead.99 The CDC has funded state
responses to COVID-19,100 and, starting in January, began hosting calls with
“state and local partners” to monitor the COVID-19 situation.101 State public
health orders should be seen as a product of such federal-state partnerships rather
than as solely determined by individual states. Similarly, states often play a role
in shaping federal legislation; indeed, on certain understandings of federalism,
states are represented through their congressional delegation, especially by their
Senators, in shaping legislation.102 And the federal legislative response would
make no sense outside of the context of state-led efforts. Thus, the federal
legislation should be seen as a response to the state legislation, that is, as an effort
to mitigate the measures states adopted in consultation with the CDC. Narrow
tailoring analysis should proceed with an eye to these efforts to mitigate.
CONCLUSION
The response to COVID-19 is not yet over. The approach I have offered
gives governments flexibility should their public health orders be found
constitutionally wanting. Additional offsets are already on the table: politicians
at both the state and federal level are calling for further remedial measures.103

96. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (describing federal and state
exchanges); Konnoth, supra note 88.
97. Konnoth, supra note 88.
98. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law Enforcement Coordination, https://www.justice.gov/usaondca/law-enforcement-coordination (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020).
99. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Injury Prevention & Control, Regional Networks,
https://www.cdc.gov/injury/stateprograms/regionalnetworks/index.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020).
100. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, CDC to Award Over $560 Million to State & Local
Jurisdictions
in
Support
of
COVID-19
Response
(Mar.
11,
2020)
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/11/cdc-to-award-over-560-million-to-state-localjurisdictions-in-support-of-covid-19-response.html.
101. Global Bio Defense, CDC National Call Series on Novel Coronavirus Monitoring &
Preparedness (Feb. 10, 2020) https://globalbiodefense.com/event/cdc-national-call-series-on-novelcoronavirus-monitoring-preparedness-3/.
102. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2017).
103. Lauren Vella, Ocasio-Cortez Blasts Coronavirus Stimulus Package As ‘Shameful’ on House
Floor, THE HILL (Mar. 27, 2020) https://thehill.com/homenews/house/489863-ocasio-cortez-blasts-22tcoronavirus-stimulus-package-as-shameful-on-house; Heather Caygle, Pelosi Eyes Next Relief Package
(Mar.
26,
2020)
as
Republicans
Downplay
Need,
POLITICO.COM
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/26/congress-coronavirus-relief-package-150338;
Zack
Budryk, Cuomo Calls $2T Stimulus ‘Reckless,’ Says It Fails to Meet New York’s Needs, THE HILL (Mar.
26, 2020) https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/489653-cuomo-calls-2t-stimulus-reckless-says-itfailed-to-meet-local-government/.
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Such measures present insufficiencies and ambiguities that may render them
constitutionally irrelevant in the COVID-19 crisis—but they do offer new ways
to think about narrowly tailoring constitutional scrutiny.

